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The Security Apparatus and the British Left, 1950s–2000s (Part II) 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper continues Part I’s exploration of the mutable and polymorphous political 
nature of the ‘enemies’ that the British security apparatus faced between the 1950s 
and the 2000s, and the ways in which their real and perceived threats expressed 
themselves and were countered by the State. Part II presented here explores some of 
the several left-wing and/or radical protest groups that the security apparatus 
monitored in order to neutralize real and perceived political and criminal threats to 
the State and society, with a particular focus on the pacifist, anti-war and anti-
apartheid movements, groups involved in industrial disputes and the environmental 
and animal rights movement. 
 
 
Keywords: security; intelligence; police; political violence; subversion; protest.  
 
The Public Discontent of the Pacifist, Anti-War and Anti-Apartheid Movements 
Between the late 1950s and the early 1960s, the discontent of the British political left 
found its expression in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), a nonviolent 
organization formed in 1958 that aimed to pressure the UK government to abandon 
nuclear weapons. CND had a middle-class outlook and often sought to work within 
established political parameters, particularly by maintaining connections with the 
Labour Party, but eventually ended up being used as “a platform and a stalking-horse 
by almost all the dissident groups.” 1  The organization was largely peaceful and 
enjoyed support from leading clergy members and cultural figures such as Bertrand 
Russell.2 CND’s flirtatious relationship with the Communist Party of Great Britain 
(CPGB) and the Soviet organization World Council of Peace made it suspect to some 
anti-nuclear-weapons activists but “did not dent the organization as much as its 
ineffectual marches and rallies and its increasingly hidebound administration, which 
was strangling itself with bureaucracy even as early as the mid-1960s.” 3  Fringe 
militants, usually anarchists, brought violence to one of CND’s annual ‘Aldermaston 
marches’ in 1963, leading Special Branch to keep a watching brief on these marches, 
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but it allegedly devoted “little time to covering the activities of the organisation or its 
individual members.”4 A more markedly violent organization and an offshoot of CND 
was the Committee of 100. It was formed in 1960 by Bertrand Russell and former 
CND members and attracted the attention of Special Branch.5 The Committee of 100 
made full use of tactics of civil disobedience. Over 1000 people were arrested in 
Trafalgar Square and more than 350 at Holy Loch in 1961.6 Several people were also 
arrested at a violent demonstration instigated during the visit to the United Kingdom 
by King Paul and Queen Frederica of the Hellenes in 1963.7  
American military intervention in South East Asia and the support offered by 
the British government led by Prime Minister Harold Wilson during the Vietnam War 
(1955–1975) further united the British political left in opposing racism, imperialism 
and capitalism and forging “alliances between students and radicals on issues such as 
sexual and racial equality.”8 The appeal of Trotskyism, Maoism and revolutionary 
figures such as Che Guevara, Fidel Castro and Ho Chi Minh emerged out of 
disillusionment with Sovietism and the Communist Party and expressed itself through 
the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC), a revolutionary organization launched in 
June 1966 under the leadership of Ken Coates and Pat Condell. 9  In 1965, the 
moderate British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam emerged as a front for the 
Communist Party, while in 1967 Maoist organizations, such as the Friends of China, 
started their activities and became involved in the VSC too. The VSC acted as an 
umbrella organization for various left-wing groups,10 such as the violence-oriented 
Maoists and the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation, and the more disciplined 
International Socialist Group (ISG), the International Marxist Group (IMG) and the 
Communist Party.11 On 22 October 1967, 10,000 peaceful marchers led by Tariq Ali 
of the IMG, Vanessa Redgrave of the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) and the 
ISG conducted the first protest against the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square in 
London.12 
Special Branch started showing increasing preoccupation with “agitation by 
various extreme left-wing organisations, pacifist and student bodies, against American 
aggression in Vietnam and the British Government’s association with U.S. policy” 
that were directing protests against the American Embassy in Downing Street, the 
House of Commons and Dow Chemicals (an American company that produced 
napalm). 13  On 17 March 1968, the VSC and the Vietnam Ad Hoc Committee 
organized a second rally. On that occasion, 80,000–100,000 activists, CND 
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supporters, trade unionists, pacifists, students and politicians “gathered in Trafalgar 
Square to hear Ali and Redgrave proclaim the revolution”14 and to support the North 
Vietnam’s National Liberation Front (NLF).15 The protest resulted in violent clashes 
between police and protesters: 16  eighty-six people were injured and almost three 
hundred protesters were arrested. 17 On the following day, the Special Operations 
Squad (SOS)18 was created within the Metropolitan Police Special Branch (MPSB) 
under the leadership of Conrad Dixon, a legendary police officer who promised to 
gather key information on subversives with “twenty men, half a million pounds and a 
free hand.” 19  Over the next seven months, a small number of MPSB officers 
infiltrated the anti-war movement, provided “intelligence about those organising the 
public disorder”20 and kept the Home Office well informed. 
Youth CND, with support from the Communist Party and the Young 
Communist League, organized the third anti-Vietnam-War protest, called 
‘Dissociation Day’, on 24 March 1968.21 Over a thousand people gathered at the Oval 
Underground Station and started their march, chanting anti-American songs and 
displaying anti-war posters.22 288 police officers and 114 reserves policed the event.23 
Protesters increased to 3000 at their meeting point in Trafalgar Square, where a 
number of speakers made the case for opposing the Vietnam War. Protesters later 
marched along Whitehall to hand in around 1000 petitions at No. 10 Downing Street. 
4000 demonstrators gathered in Whitehall, including a dozen members of ‘Kilburn 
Anarchists’ and some communists and Trotskyists shouting “Ho Chi Minh” and 
“NLF” (National Liberation Front of South Vietnam). The event was relatively 
peaceful, 24 save for six arrests, minor scuffles, some coins and a glass receptacle 
containing red dye being thrown at police officers, a smoke bomb going off in 
Whitehall, and the amusing problems caused by a demonstrator who “was sitting in 
the roadway, and being allowed to do so realised he was failing to attract sufficient 
attention, so he stood on his head.”25 In July of the same year, an anti-American 
demonstration was led by communists and infiltrated by VSC members: disorder and 
arrests ensued.26  
On 10 September 1968, Conrad Dixon described the British protest 
environment as follows: 
 
The climate of opinion among extreme left-wing elements in this 
country in relation to public political protest has undergone a radical 
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change over the last few years. The emphasis has shifted, first from 
orderly, peaceful, co-operative meetings and processions to passive 
resistance and ‘sit-downs’ and now to active confrontation with the 
authorities to attempt to force social change and alterations of 
government policy. Indeed, the more vociferous spokesmen of the left 
are calling for the complete overthrow of parliamentary democracy and 
the substitution of various brands of ‘socialism’ and ‘workers’ control.’ 
They claim that this can only be achieved by ‘action on the streets,’ 
and although few of them will admit publicly, or in the press, that they 
desire a state of anarchy, it is nevertheless tacitly accepted that such a 
condition is a necessary preamble to engineering a breakdown of our 
present system of government and achieving a revolutionary change in 
the society in which we live.27 
 
Study papers from that era located the anti-Vietnam-War protest movement within a 
larger struggle leading to worldwide revolution and regarded the upcoming 
demonstration “as a skirmish before the larger battle.”28 The VSC, with support from 
students, organized the ‘Autumn Offensive’29 in London to run between 20 and 27 
October 1968. Special Branch expected large-scale organized violence,30 particularly 
from the Trotskyist and anarchist contingents. 31  While the Young Liberals were 
firmly on the side of nonviolence,32 the Revolutionary Socialist Students Federation, 
numbering 278 members at that time, regarded throwing missiles at buildings as 
permissible and argued that police could be attacked if they tried to break up the 
march. 33  Similarly, Maoists and anarchists were not motivated by mere political 
considerations 34  but were instead willing to disregard instructions from police or 
march leaders.35 The Federation of Anarchists planned to join the original, peaceful 
march starting from the Embankment at 2 pm, while an ad hoc committee led by 
Maoists decided to hold their speeches in Trafalgar Square and to later march to the 
American Embassy.36 In the weeks leading up to the demonstration, CND decided not 
to support the protest. Special Branch’s files commented that “the pacifist element, 
which has hitherto provided a large percentage of the demonstrators at any street 
action in London, will be absent, and […] the unruly faction will not be able to shelter 
behind the screen of peaceful marchers.”37  
The VCS sought support from the Amalgamated Union of Engineering and 
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Foundry Workers (AEF) and attempted to link the upcoming demonstration with the 
1968 Chicago disturbances and the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland, but 
neither plan achieved the intended results.38 At the same time, the Anti-Imperalist 
Solidarity Movement, formed with the aim of defeating “police brutality by organised 
and disciplined resistance,” suggested demonstrators to use gas helmets, swimming 
goggles and smog masks to protect them from police action and advised them to 
“build a solid phalanx of irresistible weight and power by linking arms [… so that] the 
strongest police cordon can be broken, and the most violent police charge will fail to 
break through.”39 Maoists formed a front organization called October 27 Committee 
for Solidarity with Vietnam. They devised deceptive tactics for the upcoming 
demonstration that included traveling into London in the guise of football fans; using 
poles from placards and banners as weapons; waging a psychological war against the 
police; and acting in small secret cells of five people.40  
During the planning stages, some activists further proposed to deposit paper 
bags with house bricks along the route on the night before the demonstration41 and 
suggested a number of targets, 42 including the Bank of England, the Ministry of 
Defence, the House of Commons, New Scotland Yard, the Home Office, foreign 
embassies and other political, financial or commercial buildings. Meanwhile, Special 
Branch’s search of the Black Dwarf, an IMG-supported newspaper, found that “a 
drawing of a Molotov Cocktail and instructions [… had been] drawn on a wall.”43 Yet 
police remained cautious about the real capacity of demonstrators to attack the 
proposed targets and utilize firearms and explosives44 and expressed concern at the 
alarming, inaccurate and speculative news given by the Evening News and The Times 
in this respect.45 Government grew more and more worried about the demonstration 
planned for 27 October, and a letter from the Secretary of State for Defence Denis 
Healey to the Home Secretary James Callaghan discussed the possibility that troops 
could be called to assist with riot control procedures – a course of action that was 
eventually dismissed by both the Secretary of State and the Commissioner of Police 
of the Metropolis John Waldron.46  
The Home Secretary decided against taking exceptional action to restrict the 
demonstration, but urged the police to ensure that law-breaking actions be 
sanctioned.47 The Secretary of State further decided that foreigners with a record of 
violence should be prevented from entering the United Kingdom. 48  7000 police 
officers, 150 mounted officers (who made good use of police horses as a tool of 
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crowd control), an unspecified number of special constables and a special mobile 
group were all deployed without specific defensive or offensive gear.49 The march 
was mainly peaceful but violence erupted when about 1000 Maoists and anarchists 
broke off to rush towards Grosvenor Square, where they threw bottles, banners and 
other missiles at the police. The clashes lasted for about half an hour, after which 
these people rejoined the original group in Hyde Park.50 
Other political groups that caught the attention of Special Branch during this 
period were the Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) and its offshoot, the Stop the 
Seventy Tour (STST) Committee. From at least the late 1960s, when the movement 
was very active in protesting against apartheid in South Africa, Special Branch 
compiled numerous reports with information received from secret and reliable sources 
(there was also an informer close to the STST Committee leadership),51 uniformed 
police officers and its own officers, including SDS officers,52 who were attending 
meetings and rallies and monitoring the activities of both the AAM and the STST.53 
Communists held positions in the AAM’s committee through the CPGB and the 
South African Communist Party (SACP),54 while the Trotskyist and violence-prone 
Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) operated 
via a front organization called City of London Anti-Apartheid Group (CLAAG).55 
Peter Hain, the chairman of the STST and later a prominent Labour politician, was 
particularly active in the anti-apartheid movement. The AAM was committed to 
informing the public about the British government’s ties with the South African 
apartheid government, “to mobilise the active support of all militant anti-apartheid 
forces inside and outside the Labour and Trade Union movement [which was 
lukewarm towards the AAM], to direct this campaign with the forthcoming General 
Election in mind and to secure due recognition for the South African freedom 
struggle.” 56  Police reports were submitted to A.8 Department (public order 
preservation) and to the Home Office57 to inform ministers and civil servants of the 
evolution of the movement and its public activities. 
The anti-apartheid movement undertook direct action against British supply of 
capital and equipment to South Africa and Rhodesia, and sought to disrupt the British 
tour of the South African cricket and rugby union teams in 1969–1970. Special 
Branch gathered intelligence on the planning of the demonstrations,58 revealing that 
protestors believed that “the continuation of sporting ties between British [sic] and 
South Africa bolsters the morale of the apartheid regimes and their supporters”59 and 
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wanted to “focus attention on South Africa’s anti-apartheid policy by denying white 
South Africa any sporting outlets beyond their own country.”60 To avoid burdening 
police with serious public order maintenance duties, endangering diplomatic 
relationships with other African countries and disrupting trade relations with South 
Africa as a consequence of the likely public disorder that the tour would have caused, 
Home Secretary James Callaghan requested of the Cricket Council that the South 
African team tour be canceled.61  
But the planned demonstrations against the rugby tour went ahead. STST’s 
goal was to “harass the Springbok’s Rugby Tour that was due to start at Oxford on 
November 5,” avoiding linking the AAM with the protestors “because of the 
possibility of its leaders being charged with conspiracy to commit a public 
disorder.”62 Anti-apartheid demonstrators carried out actions at Heathrow Airport,63 
at the hotel hosting the team,64 on training grounds65 and at matches,66 where they 
planned to disperse tear gas67 and utilize seat cushions as missiles68 (it is unclear 
whether they ever undertook these actions). In December 1969, an anti-apartheid 
protestor hijacked the bus carrying the Springbok squad that was due to play England 
at Twickenham Stadium. A group of players overpowered the man and the bus 
eventually crashed without causing any loss of life.69 
Related student protests did not escape Special Branch’s surveillance.70 The 
National Union of Students (NUS) was supporting the STST committee and the anti-
apartheid movement.71 The NUS also opposed the political stances of Enoch Powell, 
a controversial British right-wing scholar and politician, and often had confrontations 
with the far-right National Front.72 But while a more markedly militant fringe was 
ready to commit serious offences in pursuance of their cause – for example, it planned 
to abduct the South African Ambassador during 1970 73  – protests were often 
peaceful. In the early-to-mid-1980s, the movement held demonstrations to protest at 
or against the South African Embassy;74 South African Prime Minister Pieter Willem 
Botha;75 meetings of South African officials;76 the existence of the independent South 
African State of Bophuthatswana; 77  the South African Airways Office; 78 
supermarkets selling South African food;79 rugby matches;80 the Blue Star Port Lines, 
a company that maintained shipping services to Namibia;81 the Foreign Office;82 and 
the British government’s plan “to use South Africa as a staging post for the 
construction of an airport in the Falklands.”83  
The AAM was later disbanded in 1994 and replaced with Action for Southern 
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Africa (ACTSA), a group primarily concerned “with providing information and 
education on issues in Southern Africa” and therefore “of little interest to […Special] 
Branch.” 84  But much before that time, Special Branch spent considerable effort 
monitoring two of the most symbolic disputes of the 1970s and the 1980s, during 
periods of heated industrial unrest and at a time of intense confrontations between 
trade unions and the State. It is also an era when, historian Clive Bloom argues, the 
police acted as ‘foot soldiers’ on behalf of a tight-knit group of right-wing activists 
with a vigilante image (e.g. the National Association for Freedom and Civil 
Assistance) in order to defeat socialism; the security services waged a black 
propaganda war with the miners that “spread paranoia among those who were being 
watched and create[d] circumstances under which [this] paranoia destroyed its victims 
without them having to intervene;”85 and the military-style tactics employed by the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland informed mainland policing 
dealing with strikers and rioters. 86 Yet these largely peaceful strikes incorporated 
some fringe elements dedicated to achieving their political goals via violent means. 
The next section focuses on the Grunwick (1976–1978) and the Wapping 
(1984–1985) disputes that saw Special Branch and the government working together 
in monitoring the activities of violent and nonviolent groups that were protesting in 
the name of labor rights. 
 
Industrial Unrest, Labor Rights and Public Disorder: the Grunwick and 
Wapping Disputes 
The Grunwick dispute was one of the most iconic British disputes in the second half 
of the twentieth century and centered on labor conditions and workers’ rights at the 
Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories in Willesden (London), in particular issues 
related to low wages; compulsory overtime; unfair dismissal; and lack of trade union 
recognition. The company’s largely Asian female workforce 87 and trade unionists 
started organizing strikes and pickets in August 1976.88 Within a few weeks, protest 
had already escalated: 137 striking workers were dismissed and pickets became the 
new normal at Grunwick. 89  In early November 1976, the Union of Post Office 
Workers (UPW) ‘blacked’ (that is, refused to handle) Grunwick mail until a legal 
threat forced them to abandon this course of action.90  
The dispute further intensified and attracted national attention in June 1977, 
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when police and company employees started facing public disorder, abuse, 
threatening behavior and violence from hard-core militants that the moderate white-
collar union the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff 
(APEX) and the Grunwick Strike Committee could neither control nor restrain.91 The 
SWP was particularly active in infiltrating the dispute in pursuance of its own agenda 
and did not refrain from engaging in public disorder and violent confrontation with 
the police. While APEX kept a distance from the SWP and treated it as “a proscribed 
organisation,”92 the SWP managed both to influence the Brent Trades Council, which 
was playing a prominent role in support of the strikers, and to mainstream militant 
activities. 93  The SWP effectively introduced violence within the dispute and “in 
anticipation of an eventual victory by the striking workers, pose[d] as their 
champions.”94 The picket lines were joined by several other groups, including the 
IMG, the WRP, the Revolutionary Workers Party (Trotskyist), the Indian Workers 
Movement/Caribbean Workers Organisation and many others.95  
But the SWP and its Trotskyist allies soon became disenchanted with the 
dispute. The Grunwick Film Processing Laboratories were not going to crumble 
anytime soon, the various groups were uncoordinated, the police were successful in 
containing the situation and daily pickets were placing a financial strain on activists.96 
The SWP therefore took a more marginal and strategic direction by “providing mere 
presence, prepared, as always, to leap into any breach that can be exploited.”97 In this 
context, the CPGB started manifesting a more evident interest in the dispute, 
attempting to have a dominant influence98 and becoming “committed to mobilising 
maximum support from within the trade union movement for the strikers.” 99 The 
dispute moved beyond the disagreements between the company management and 
APEX, which the CPGB considered to be “too right wing.”100 Instead, the trade union 
movement adopted the wider goal of imposing mandatory trade union membership on 
private companies.101  
The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and notable figures such as 
Arthur Scargill,102 the powerful leader of the Yorkshire branch of the NUM (later to 
become the leader of the NUM between 1982 and 2002) who had his own recording 
category103 (‘unaffiliated subversive’)104 in the Personal File (PF) system held by the 
Security Service, started becoming involved in the picketing, attracting larger 
numbers of protesters which caused problems of public disorder. APEX and the Trade 
Union Congress (TUC) later planned a ‘National Day of Action’, a large 
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demonstration to be held outside the premises of the company on 11 July 1977. The 
demonstration was welcomed by the CPGB 105  and was supported by Arthur 
Scargill106 and other notable trade unionists, such as Hugh Scanlon, the president of 
the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW). 107 This demonstration 
became yet another occasion for the SWP to place violence at the heart of the 
dispute.108  
Government was well briefed about the developments and Prime Minister 
James Callaghan was personally informed about the event and the consequences that 
the involvement of the NUM and Arthur Scargill might have had for public order.109 
The NUM later became the target of large-scale surveillance via police infiltrators, 
Security Service’s intelligence and GCHQ’s auditing with the National Security 
Agency (NSA) in the United States. This surveillance was so extensive that the 
phone-tapping and bugging systems of the Tinkerbell Squad ended up breaking 
down.110 The political environment and the long-term threat that the dispute posed to 
government raised grave prime ministerial concerns. Callaghan encouraged more 
proactive policing methods and controversially stated that “the Government was not 
dealing with respectable unionism but rent a mob.”111 Police braced themselves for 
major public disorder. The ‘National Day of Action’ was expected to become the 
most violent demonstration on British soil, resulting in “some 2,000 potentially 
violent Trotskyists and the like augmenting an indeterminate but massive number of 
trade unionists, Communist Party members and other less extreme demonstrators.”112  
The proceedings ended up as two separate events that attracted around 15,000 
demonstrators: APEX and the TUC led a peaceful march, while the Grunwick Strike 
Committee, with support from miners, engineers and builders, led a picket outside the 
premises of the company.113 Militant Trotskyists, far-left youngsters and a number of 
miners engaged in violent confrontation with the police114 but failed to live up to the 
much gloomier expectations of the authorities. The dispute continued with further 
pickets, arrests, confrontations and various events, such as the publication of the 
Scarman Report, 115  until mid-1978, when the strike finally ended. The MPSB 
thoroughly monitored the activities of these groups, while the Metropolitan Police 
Service Special Patrol Group (MPS SPG) was present during pickets116 and the SDS 
played a pivotal role in providing up-to-date information on what uniform branch was 
to expect. Two former MPSB senior officers, Ray Wilson and the late Ian Adams, 
recount that “On most days an early-morning telephone call was made from the senior 
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officer of the SDS to the Deputy Assistant Commissioner of ‘A’ Department, 
responsible for public order, giving him the latest available intelligence on the 
extremists’ plans for the day.”117 
 During the two years of dispute, police arrested 500 people, 118  amid 
accusations from APEX that officers had assaulted protesters, unlawfully disrupted 
strikes and conducted indiscriminate arrests.119 This highly symbolic dispute opened a 
debate on whether employers had a right not to recognize trade unions and whether 
the law could be utilized to achieve such recognition. 120  Set within a decade of 
turbulent industrial unrest and battles for labor rights, the Grunwick dispute represents 
“a test case of ideological binary oppositions: ‘individual freedom’ versus ‘solidarity’; 
‘over-mighty unions’ versus ‘over-mighty bosses’; ‘voluntarism’ in industrial 
relations versus ‘the rule of law’; ‘us’ versus ‘them.’”121 
Almost a decade later, another industrial dispute would become a new 
battleground for trade unionism and workers’ rights, in an era when Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher was keen both to target what she perceived to be a culture of moral 
degeneration within the political left and to “curb union power (and its apparently 
communistic corporatism).”122 In early 1986, the collapse in the negotiations between 
newspaper workers and their employer, News International, over Rupert Murdoch’s 
plan to move the printing and distribution of newspapers from Fleet Street to a new 
warehouse in Wapping (London), “where journalists would input copy directly on 
screen and the jobs of several thousand printers would be rendered redundant,”123 
opened a new wave of industrial unrest. Murdoch’s decision angered the print unions 
and resulted in a strike by 6000 newspaper workers. These workers were quickly 
dismissed. 124  Pickets and demonstrations were soon organized to “disrupt the 
movement of newspapers from the plant [… and] to prevent vehicles using Virginia 
Street to access The Highway.” 125  Residents of Wapping led demonstrations in 
support of the print workers and police prevented local protesters from returning 
home while extending “abusive behavior and arbitrary arrest” 126  to journalists, 
photographers, TV cameramen and first-aid workers.  
A small contingent of SWP members,127 other Trotskyists, communists and 
anarchists joined the dispute, which led to violent confrontations with the police and 
1200 arrests in just over one year.128 The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS)129 and 
informants130 helped the MPSB monitor all aspects of the dispute, which soon became 
a drain on police resources “on a par with that in Warrington [Messenger Industrial 
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Dispute] in 1983.”131 Senior police officers sought to differentiate between the print 
workers, whose cooperation could “be elicited in attempting to preserve order”132 and 
“extremist elements unconnected with the unions [who instigate] violence on the 
picket lines.”133 However, secret police reports equally noted the “emergence of a 
substantial group of militant print workers [… who might devise] their own methods 
of protest and perhaps join forces with the now [note: in mid-May 1986] established 
extremist elements.” 
Industrial action was carried out continuously for over one year. Disclosed 
police files offer insights into a large demonstration that was organized by the South 
East Region Trades Union Council (SERTUC) together with the Labour Party ‘Joint 
May Day Committee’ on 1 May 1986.134 The demonstration attracted about 3000 
people: 1500 trade unionists (mostly print workers), 1000 members of various left-
wing groups and 500 Turks. The event included the presence of “paper sellers for 
Class War, Socialist Worker, New Worker and Militant”135 and banners representing 
the small faction of hard left-wing movements alongside the larger contingent of soft 
left-wing groups and trade unions.136 The demonstration resulted in violence, with 
missiles being thrown at police, who made dozens of arrests.137 Two days later, this 
rally was followed by a ‘May Day’ national demonstration.138 The demonstration 
started peacefully but by the evening it descended into violence and disorder139 to a 
level “that had not previously been witnessed in connection with this dispute.”140 
Smoke bombs, thunderflashes, wood, bricks and other missiles were thrown at police 
officers 141  by what the MPSB described as “not the middle-aged printworkers 
normally seen on a Saturday evening, but […] younger, hooligan types which 
included both Trotskyists and anarchists […] taking advantage of the situation to 
attack the police.”142 The night ended with eighty-one arrests and with 175 police 
officers and forty-eight demonstrators injured.143 The violence eventually “provided 
something of a watershed for many printworkers and [was] reflected in the 
diminishing numbers […] attending demonstrations outside the News International 
plant”144 in the following three weeks.  
Pickets and demonstrations nonetheless continued to take place, sometimes 
without incident,145 sometimes with protestors intending but failing to commit violent 
actions,146 and sometimes with violence and disorder,147 whenever Trotskyists and 
anarchists were successful in exploiting the emotions of the day and the frustration of 
the strikers 148  to bring chaos into the dispute. 149  Police faced accusations of 
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employing paramilitary tactics that had originally been devised for, and utilized in, 
the Battle of Orgreave during the 1984–1985 miners’ strike, thus essentially “moving 
from uniformed citizens keeping the peace to activists in militarised operations.”150 
The Wapping dispute ended in early 1987, “less than two years after the collapse of 
the miners’ strike […, and] the print unions ended up as neutered as the National 
Union of Mineworkers.”151 But, for the next two decades, the State continued to face 
a series of mutable threats that required the security apparatus to spend considerable 
time gathering intelligence on a plethora of politically active groups. 
 
Security Responses against the Mutable Threats Posed by Various Left-Wing 
Groups Between the 1980s and the 2000s 
From as early as the 1960s and until the early 1980s, the Security Service classified 
CND as a ‘subversive’ organization, had a spy called Harry Newton in its office152 
and kept the group under surveillance, believing that it acted as an entryist platform 
under the influence of Trotskyists and communists, particularly the CPGB, which had 
a majority eight seats out of fifteen of CND’s national executive by the mid-1970s.153 
In the mid-to-late 1970s, the government even mobilized the army due to fears of 
potential terrorist action around nuclear sites in Scotland.154 CND benefitted from the 
role played by the more confrontational Greenham Common as a coordinating force 
behind the organization and as speakers during rallies. In 1981, Joan Ruddock took up 
the CND chair and, at a time of particular good fortune, the organization counted 
16,500 national members and a total membership of 200,000 people.155 But security 
concerns over foreign influences were unfounded. The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB) did not play any major role in CND and “the [Security] Service 
found no evidence that funding to the British peace movement went beyond 
occasional payment of fares and expenses to individuals.”156 It was, however, the 
State Security Service of the German Democratic Republic that received information 
from a member of CND’s national committee.157 Joan Ruddock and Jeremy Corbyn 
had PFs opened by both the Security Service 158 and the SDS159 for, respectively, 
having meetings with a Soviet journalist who was a KGB officer (Ruddock was 
unaware)160 and his involvement in the organization. Several activists within CND 
also had PFs opened by the Security Service that were later passed on to ministers.161 
Although CND was removed from the ‘subversive’ list, the security apparatus 
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continued to collect intelligence on the group amid persisting fears of Trotskyist and 
communist penetration and the unpredictable nature of the large demonstrations that 
the group continued to plan. Notably, in 1983 the Ministry of Defence set up a unit 
called Defence Secretariat 19 to monitor CND.162 Between 1980 and 1983, CND 
organized several activities, such as rallies and camps in Westminster, at Trafalgar 
Square and in Hyde Park; a blockade of the Royal Ordnance Factory; a picket of the 
Russian Embassy; a march along Embankment; protests against the visit of the then 
Secretary of Defense of the United States Caspar Weinberger; a die-in at the Bank of 
England; a ‘Stop the City Demonstration’; and eighteen peace camps.163 During the 
same period, CND was seeking to move away from being a merely anti-American 
organization to encompass anti-Soviet sentiments too. It was in this spirit that the 
group organized a ‘Human Chain’ demonstration on 16 July 1983 to link the Soviet 
embassy in Kensington Palace Gardens with the United States embassy in Grosvenor 
Square.164 Special Branch considered this event to pose a low risk to public order.165 
And so it did. Approximately 7000 people took part in the demonstration, leaders 
presented anti-nuclear petitions to the embassies’ staff and, save for a single arrest for 
‘insulting behavior,’ the demonstration was entirely peaceful.166  
It was a national demonstration planned to take place three months later, on 22 
October, that made police and government 167  more concerned about the risks of 
public disorder and the actions of fringe militant elements within CND. Special 
Branch expected a level of support similar to that witnessed during the previous two 
national demonstrations (50,000–70,000), nonviolent direction action (in particular, a 
spontaneous sit-down protest in the Whitehall area), clashes between CND and anti-
CND groups – notably, the Coalition for Peace Through Security (CPS) and Women 
for Defence – and attempts by some punk anarchists who had been “involved in the 
recent ‘Stop the City’ event […to] ‘take over’ the CND demonstration, using black 
flags as an identifying feature.” 168 But while police underestimated the numerical 
support for what was the largest ever CND march – a record 200,000 demonstrators 
were in attendance, – they overestimated their threat to public order. The great 
majority of demonstrators acted in a peaceful manner and the five-and-a-half-hour-
long march169 resulted in neither incidents nor attempts at nonviolent direct action, 
and the punk anarchist contingent had little success in attempting to stop the march.170 
The political left was represented, among other groups, by 25 branches of the CPGB, 
several trade union members and a Trotskyist presence in the SWP, numbering 600–
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700 supporters. In their overall assessment of the event, police noted the support of 
ordinary people for CND and the “relatively low turn-out of extremists [… who were] 
vociferous [… but] had little or no effect on the day’s proceedings.”171 The strategy of 
entryism that some extremist political groups advanced by using CND “in the wider 
context of left-wing politics rather than the narrow confines of the ‘peace 
movement’”172 was given a deadly blow on that very day. 
 The London School of Economics’ Student CND later organized a peaceful 
demonstration called ‘Books not Bombs’ on 4 March 1984. It was a quiet 
demonstration that attracted a mere 250 people and did not pose any public order 
issue. 173  Government and police were more concerned about gathering reliable 
intelligence on a series of demonstrations taking place in June that year and 
culminating in a ‘Day of Action’ on 9 June to coincide with the Economic Summit at 
Lancaster House in London, when President Ronald Reagan was due to attend.174 
Expecting no serious public disorder, aside from potential attempts from the Class 
War Collective of Anarchists to create confusion and inspire acts of criminal 
damage,175 the Home Office F4 Division (counter-terrorism) could not prohibit this 
unwelcome demonstration and planned to give police the necessary support to 
maintain public order and security, “while conceding to the marchers a route 
sufficiently close to their objective to win their consent and co-operation.”176 
 Meanwhile, by the early 1990s the SWP had lost members and financial 
support.177 Unlike communists, the SWP had no associations with foreign powers178 
and, unlike Militant Tendency (MT), with which it maintained an antagonistic 
relationship,179 did not engage in entryist tactics. While attendance of six or more 
meetings of the Party was considered proof of membership and anyone attending 
these meetings was recorded as “member: Trotskyst organisation,” “many individuals 
attended these meetings to protest against specific issues such as the NHS cuts or the 
poll tax, subjects of legitimate dissent.” 180  The Security Service’s management 
retained an interest in the SWP following its support of various industrial disputes in 
the early 1990s and maintained a telephone tap on the Party’s headquarters. Many 
intercepts, however, were never transcribed. A large number of English-speaking 
telephone intercept transcribers had been directed from F Branch to T Branch (Irish 
terrorism) to work against the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) by the time 
the Security Service took over responsibility for Northern Ireland-related terrorism in 
1992,181 and the Security Service devoted almost half of its resources to it by 1994.182 
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The number of agents who assigned to the SWP was greatly reduced and the last 
telephone tap against an individual member of the group – its founder Tony Cliff – 
was terminated. 
But a decline in membership and faltering finances did not deter the SWP 
from engaging in political activism. The group remained highly invested in the global 
justice and anti-war movements and acted as the “organisational engine of the 
[Respect Party] project”183 that was launched by Salma Yaqoob and George Monbiot 
in 2004. The SWP effectively dominated the global justice movement in the United 
Kingdom in the late 1990s and early 2000s, achieving positions of leadership in 
Globalise Resistance (GR), an umbrella group that was formed “as a means to 
federate different forces of the left in order to get involved in the emerging [alter-
globalization] movement in Britain which was originally dominated by anarchist 
groups such as Reclaim the Streets.”184 Special Branch, via the SDS, kept an eye on 
the SWP’s activities and infiltrated an undercover officer into the main committee of 
GR.185  
This was a period when Special Branch was particularly active in monitoring 
and disrupting the activities of environmental and animal rights protestors – a loose 
aggregate of people who fall under the umbrella of the international Radical 
Environmentalist and Animal Rights (REAR) movement. The REAR movement 
includes various groups that condone radical, often illegal, actions that expose or stop 
environmental destruction and animal abuse but that differ in tactics and strategic 
direction. The REAR movement was originally born out of a willingness to use 
aggressive tactics and to undertake direct action against animal abuse. In the United 
Kingdom, the movement was active throughout the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s with 
support from “a general [ideological] consensus of the left and of intellectuals”186 and 
was popularized through the activities of groups such as the Hunt Retribution Squad, 
the Band of Mercy and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF),187 which emerged in 1976 
from the more moderate Hunt Saboteurs Association (HAS) and was penetrated by 
the SDS.188 The ALF boomed and reached over 1500 members by the mid-1980s, 
having gained a foothold in the United States in 1979 and having given rise to even 
more radical and openly violent groups, such as the Animal Rights Militia (ARM).189 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the British ALF engaged in violence, committed 
criminal damage and intimidated a wide range of targets, 190  including prominent 
politicians (e.g. Margaret Thatcher and William Whitelaw), academics (e.g. Colin 
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Blakemore) and the general public (e.g. an attempt to contaminate bottles of the 
popular soft drink Lucozade in 1991). Between 1990 and 1992 the Animal Rights 
National Index (ARNI) recorded 3073 crimes. The first eight months of 1994 
recorded 585 incidents, many involving criminal damage and including twenty-nine 
incendiary attacks, which resulted in a total of £5.4 million in damage.191 
Protest by animal rights activists towards both organizations that carried out 
vivisection and the pharmaceutical companies and businesses that provided, 
respectively, contract work and resources increased a decade later, at the beginning of 
2004. Although many activists were peaceful, a militant fringe used a wide array of 
tactics, such as threats, intimidation and harassment, and engaged in serious 
criminality, including “contamination threats, blackmail and the use of improvised 
explosive devices.”192 They utilized crime as a strategic tool to pursue an ideological 
cause and were dealt with by counter-terrorism police as ‘domestic extremists.’193 
These extremists switched their tactics from “attacks on premises where animals were 
farmed for fur or bred for experimental purposes or where experiments were carried 
out, increasingly to the homes and families of employees of organizations engaged in 
research using animals.”194 In the first six months of 2004, a vast array of intimidating 
tactics included “arson, criminal damage to homes or vehicles, threatening animal 
rights graffiti”195 and so on, while in the second half of the same year, there was a 
strategic change to targeting employees of supply companies. After the chief 
executive officers (CEOs) of (mostly Japanese) scientific and pharmaceutical 
companies in the United Kingdom exerted pressure and threatened to move their 
business to other countries, government responded by empowering the police and 
creating offences196 to target animal rights extremism via specific provisions set out 
in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), a group formed in 1999 with the 
purpose of stopping the activities of Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), a company 
testing the effects of drugs on animals, was a particularly effective and hard-to-defeat 
animal rights organization. The group carried out a blend of lawful demonstrations 
and illegal acts of intimidation197 that resulted in about 100 companies terminating 
contracts with HLS in 2004.198 By 2006, HLS had moved its headquarters to the 
United States, having been delisted on the UK and US stock exchanges.199 Later on, 
the animal rights movement targeted banks and financial companies that were 
investing in the biotechnology industry. Police employed a set of preventative, 
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intelligence and enforcement strategies to deal with animal rights activists and 
extremists. Against the conventional notion that organized crime is an illegal activity 
that merely involves a financial element of profit-making, the police sought to prevent 
and pursue the activities of SHAC, SPEAK – the Voice for the Rights of Animals and 
other groups through typically anti-organized-crime-oriented activities of 
investigative policing. In this sense, police were careful not to charge for offences 
under the Terrorism Act 2000, in order to ensure that the legislation was preserved for 
more serious cases.  
Incidents of animal rights extremism drastically reduced over a five-year 
period (2006–2010).200 In the case of SHAC, an investigative strategy that pursued 
cases of conspiracy to blackmail and removed the group’s leadership resulted in a 
decline in offending and harm to the company. 201  Nonetheless, policing activity 
“could not prevent HLS and other companies that supplied services and products to 
HLS losing income,”202 and it endangered human rights (particularly the rights to 
assembly and to free protest) and gave rise to prosecution cases lost in court, 
litigations against the police and misconduct procedures that were brought against 
police officers.203 In so doing, the police “pushed the campaign organisations’ leaders 
to adopt new tactics and become innovative in the use of technology and social media 
to achieve their objectives and avoid detection.”204 
The radical animal rights movement, with its focus on the rights of sentient 
beings, helped shape the ideological contours of the closely linked radical 
environmentalist movement, which focused on the wider rights of the whole 
ecosystem. It worked via grassroots, leaderless organizations that conducted direct 
action and resistance in pursuance of their common goal to uphold ideas of 
biocentrism and the equality of human and non-human species.205 This movement 
“includes groups like Earth First! and the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), but also green 
anarchists, ecofeminists, Pagans and Wiccans, and anti-globalization and anti-
capitalist protestors.”206 While the activities of some of these groups are dubbed ‘eco-
terrorism,’ the term is often an inaccurate representation of radical individuals who 
may well conduct illegal activities (e.g. animal liberations, vandalism and cyber-
attacks) but who do not engage in terrorism per se. The latter is the preserve of a tiny 
minority of environmental extremists who do not refrain from bombings, arson and 
other criminal tactics to instill fear and bring about political change. In this sense, “the 
label ecoterrorism should not be used for the whole REAR movement, but only for 
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some of its actions, individuals and groups,”207 insofar as the movement runs along a 
‘protest, crime, terrorism’ continuum.208 
A decisive security shift towards environmental activism, which would later 
be fully penetrated by the NPOIU, occurred at a time – the 1990s – when chief 
constables across England and Wales were frustrated at the successes of the anti-road 
movement, originally pioneered by Earth First! in 1980 and re-popularized by 
Reclaim the Streets (RTS) a decade later. The anti-road movement stopped work at 
sites across the country and often drew from the ranks of the more explicitly violent 
animal liberation groups. Radical green activists accumulated sophisticated tactics 
learnt by the anti-road movement and, mirroring the achievements of cruise missiles 
activists, became a natural focus of police attention.209  
In 1991–1992, protest campaigns by Alarm UK, a national umbrella 
organization for local anti-road action groups and affiliated groups, included “a 
mixture of innovative publicity stunts, demonstrations, mass letter-writing and the 
circulation of alternative sustainable transport plans and counter-information to the 
media.”210 These campaigns took a new dimension in the summer of 1992, when 
environmental and anti-road activists attempted to stop the building of the M3 at 
Twyford Down. Local action groups, young activists of the Donga Tribe and 
members of Earth First! obstructed the machinery and engaged in mass trespass of the 
Twyford Down construction site, eventually leading to “physical confrontations with 
security guards, and large-scale arrests from the police.”211 The battle did not succeed 
but “substantially managed to increase the costs of construction and strengthened the 
alliance between local groups working with Alarm UK and radical environmental 
groups”212 operating underground to undertake economic sabotage via direct action in 
protection of the environment (e.g. Earth Liberation Front).213 
Environmental and anti-road groups were subjected to crafty police tactics that 
undermined their operational capacities. Here, conspiracy theories abound. A former 
member of RTS believes that the police ‘allowed’ short-term violence to take place in 
order to stop the longer-term threat of a large movement on the streets that was 
developing a surprisingly vast and mostly nonviolent activist reach and that was 
willing to break the law with illegal protests. The real contours of Operation 
Yellowstone remain shrouded in secrecy; however, some activists claim that it may 
have effectively ended RTS. This police operation took place during the ‘May Day 
Guerrilla Gardening’ in London. The former RTS member mentioned above contends 
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that police deliberately flooded the square, corralling people at Whitehall and leaving 
a McDonald’s at Whitehall (a key target that had been attacked twice before during 
similar protests), the Churchill monument and the Cenotaph entirely unprotected. 
Police argue that, on this occasion, the absence of riot officers served to avoid inciting 
violent public disorder, while activists and members of Indymedia (a network 
affiliated with the global justice movement) believe that it was a calculated plan to 
allow violence to take place and later discredit the peaceful image of the group.214 
 Travelers were also thoroughly monitored by the secret wing of the police. 
Policing activities in this sphere can be traced back to the early 1970s, when “New 
Traveller culture grew out of the music festival scene.”215 The group known as New 
Age Travellers “originated in the free festivals and lifestyle experiments of the 1960s 
[…,] in meetings at Stonehenge, at Windsor and the Phun City Festival on the Isle of 
Wight.” 216 It emerged from the alternative-lifestyle communities of the 1960s. A 
decade later, these communities turned to squatting and ecological causes peppered 
with “anarchist ideas of social justice,”217 which found an ideological ally in the anti-
nuclear movement.218 In 1973, police clamped down on the disorganization, deviance 
and drug culture of the travelers who were gathering at the Windsor ‘People’s Free 
Festival’ and sought to disrupt the low-level criminality of the group. Similarly, 
police used a heavy hand in dealing with the first Stonehenge Festival in 1974.219 By 
the 1980s, “the older hippy elements had morphed into something different [… and 
the movement] was not merely into drugs but was becoming radicalised.”220 Protests 
under the common political banner of social justice, and in support of Greenham 
Common, started becoming a normal occurrence to the point that “By 1983, the 
mixture of festival and protest at Stonehenge attracted 30,000 people and finally, with 
the miners’ strike in full flow, class-war demonstrations held to ‘stop the city’ and 
with the memory of Toxteth, Brixton and Moss Side, the celebrations were getting 
more ugly and confrontational.”221 
 In 1984, travelers infiltrated and brought violence into peaceful animal rights 
protests, leading police to break up two festivals at Boscombe Down Airfield and 
Nostell Priory. 222  The following year, police took stronger action against the 
Stonehenge festival. Six different territorial police forces, plus military police, set up 
roadblocks to stop 140 vehicles and 450 people traveling to Stonehenge. More than a 
thousand police officers in riot gear patrolled what became an ‘exclusion zone’ and 
entered into violent confrontations with the travelers, in what is now known as the 
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Battle of Beanfield, leading to legal actions for false imprisonment. 223  Police 
historically dealt with the travelers via pre-emptive strategies and paramilitary 
methods224 of public order policing: the Battle of Beanfield is one such example. 
However, by the mid-1990s police had started pursuing a more pragmatic 
approach. 225  The Castlemorton Festival of 1992, which brought together 25,000 
travelers and resulted in 100 arrests, was a key occasion for the Southern Central 
Intelligence Unit (operating from Devizes in Wiltshire and covering the south of the 
country), the Northern New Age Traveller Co-ordination Unit (operating from Penrith 
in Cumbria and covering the north of the country), some individual police 
constabularies and the Ministry of Defence to monitor ravers 226  and travelers. 227 
About 8000 travelers in attendance, having access to about 2000 vehicles 228  and 
acting as catalysts for drug dealers, 229  were targeted by blanket countrywide 
injunctions against public events,230 legislation, intelligence, harassment, benefit cuts 
and alleged fabrication of news231 that placed enormous pressure on free parties and a 
largely lawless movement. 232  The festival resulted in the exacerbation in the 
relationship between traveler culture and the State. Two years later, the police were 
granted further powers via the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to better 
deal with the raves, squatting and trespass that occurred during events organized by 
anti-road protesters, gypsies and travelers. The Southern and Northern intelligence 
units held a database with information on travelers, while police officers took 
photographs and videos of people, vehicles and sites that were allegedly used for 
“gathering purposes, rather than to inform proactive policing.”233  
Proactive policing in this sphere remained confined to an imminent and 
serious breach of public order that necessitated the covert collection of information 
for prevention.234 Prosecutions for trespass and arrests for returning to a rave after 
being required to leave under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 were 
rare, save for specific instances (protests against the building of the Newbury bypass 
that led to 356 arrests: 258 people were prosecuted and fifty-nine people were 
cautioned for aggravated trespass).235 Although the law endowed police with a wide 
range of powers, the reality is that “formal action by way of a police caution or 
prosecution was relatively infrequent […] because the directions, or even the threat of 
their use, were commonly found to resolve situations without the need for arrests.”236 
A few years later, in 1999, the NPOIU was established and continued its operations 
until 2011. The unit placed officers within Earth First!, Camp for Climate Action, The 
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Common Place, Dissent!, Cardiff Anarchist Network and many more direct action 
groups, thoroughly monitoring the REAR and the anarchist-communist movements, 
in an attempt to know, prevent and disrupt the activities of elusive and ever mutating 
‘enemies’ that since the new millennium have extolled a plurality of political 
causes237 and that the British State has countered, and continues to counter, in defense 
of the realm. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the paper (Part I and Part II) has sought to present a non-exhaustive history 
of the political terrain in which the security apparatus operated during and after the 
Cold War and the various left-wing and/or radical political groups that were deemed 
to pose a threat of public disorder, political violence and subversion. The real 
contours of state covert action against a whole range of politically active groups will 
never fully emerge. Yet the tensions between, on the one hand, the security of the 
public and the well-being of the State and, on the other hand, civil liberties and human 
rights will continue to shape a dichotomous relationship between radical political 
activism and state surveillance. Within the limited context of Western undercover and 
intelligence activities resides a larger political world, where the State identifies 
historically contingent domestic ‘enemies’, often residing on the left of the political 
spectrum, which pose real and perceived threats to national security and/or public 
order. The paper contributes to scholarly understandings of both the evolving nature 
of these ‘enemies’ and the intelligence activities that the secret wing of the British 
State put in place to monitor, anticipate and disrupt political and criminal threats. 
Whether they be foreign spies, British traitors, communists, Trotskyists, anarchists, 
environmental and animal rights campaigners or extremists of other types, individuals 
and groups considered to engage in subversion, espionage, political violence and/or 
public disorder did not escape the crafty tactics that the Security Service and Special 
Branch adopted to defend the status quo and protect society from harm. The ongoing 
Undercover Policing Inquiry is set to conclude in mid-2018 but its consequences are 
destined to continue shaping future debates on the role of the State and its actors 
within the political life of the country – and these are debates that touch on the 
intrinsically connected and mutually shaping relationship between security activity 
vis-à-vis militant and/or dissident political action in conceptualizing the historically 
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contingent, acceptable and unacceptable social contours of the United Kingdom.                                                           
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